Election years in Indonesia often bring more teachers—both contract and civil service positions—and higher salaries due to intense clientelistic competition. This surge occurs despite government programmatic promises about education reform. The study leverages unique timing of elections across districts, exploiting exogenous shocks like the fall of Suharto's authoritarian rule. Focusing on Java and Sumatra specifically highlights regional patterns influenced by political shifts from past incumbents (especially former ruling party members) to new entrants. Researchers tracked changes in temporary hires versus permanent civil service posts before/after election cycles.

📊 Data & Methods:

Used district-level data comparing pre- and post-election periods across diverse regions of Indonesia.

Exploited natural experiments created by different timing for programmatic vs competitive elections.

Applied regression discontinuity designs to isolate causal effects linked to electoral competition.

🔍 Key Findings:

Election-related increases in teacher contracts are substantial, even when central government policies push toward permanent hires.

Civil service certification processes accelerate dramatically during politically contested periods.

Average teacher salaries rise significantly due to increased hiring and patronage-based allocation strategies.

These effects vary substantially by district depending on the balance of power between old regime supporters and new political actors.

💡 Why It Matters:

It demonstrates how electoral competition, even in decentralized systems with institutional reforms, intensifies clientelism.

Highlights the vulnerability of merit-based public sector hiring to short-term political pressures.

Provides insights into Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition politics through a visible lens like teacher employment.