Drug cartels openly murder government officials and party candidates during periods of intense political polarization. This article investigates why criminal organizations would choose such tactics despite typically preferring bribery over violence, suggesting that this strategic decision is linked to their goal of establishing control within local communities.

Understanding the Data & Methods Used

* Analyzed original datasets tracking high-profile attacks from 2007-2012 in Mexico

* Combined quantitative analysis with qualitative evidence through case studies

* Examined timing patterns during election cycles and geographic targeting strategies

Key Findings of the Study

* Cartels intensified violence specifically during local elections to influence incoming governments

* Geographically adjacent municipalities were frequently targeted, establishing territorial dominance

* Federal partisan rivalries provided little protection against cartel violence due to political polarization

* These findings challenge previous assumptions about criminal organizations strictly avoiding political ties while demonstrating how they strategically engage with the political system.

Implications for Political Science Research

* The study reveals that organized crime groups can effectively establish de facto governance systems through strategic violence