This article proposes an informational mechanism linking diplomatic visits abroad to leader survival. It suggests that foreign powers visit incumbents to secure future policy concessions; these visits are valuable only if the incumbent remains in power long enough to deliver on agreements.

The study argues that a diplomatic visit serves as a visible and credible signal of confidence from visiting nations regarding the host's political stability.

This communication helps address information asymmetry faced by domestic opponents, who may lack clear insights into an incumbent leader's strength or longevity before deciding whether to challenge them.

Data & Methods:

* Time Period: 1960-2013

* Country Focus: United States Diplomatic Visits dataset

* Analysis Technique: Quantitative analysis examining visit frequency and leader tenureship patterns during this period

Key Findings:

* US diplomatic visits significantly reduced the risk of leaders being removed from office.

* The signal sent by foreign visits appears effective in deterring domestic challenges to sitting presidents.

The results demonstrate substantial empirical support for this counterintuitive explanation: frequent foreign state visits correlate strongly with increased leader survival.