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Electoral Weakness Drives Protectionist Trade Policy
Insights from the Field
presidential particularism
electoral calculus
United States
quantitative analysis
American Politics
PSR&M
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Dataverse
Presidential Particularism and U.S. Trade Politics was authored by Kenneth S. Lowande, Jeffery A. Jenkins and Andrew J. Clarke. It was published by Cambridge in PSR&M in 2018.

Presidential Particularism in U.S. Trade Politics

This paper explores how presidential electoral incentives shape trade policy decisions through unilateral executive actions.

### What Is Presidential Particularism?

Presidential particularism refers to the strategy where leaders strategically distribute political favors based on electoral considerations rather than a consistent ideological stance.

Our findings reveal that:

  • Presidents systematically allocate protectionist benefits (via executive orders) using an electoral calculus;
  • States lacking comfortable presidential majorities receive more trade protections from 1986–2006;
  • This distributive behavior extends significantly into the realm of foreign affairs;
  • The president's authority for unilateral trade adjustments remains substantial.

This research demonstrates that seemingly non-partisan executive actions often reflect underlying political motivations.

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