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When Rebels Outsource Kidnapping to Criminal Gangs
Insights from the Field
Kidnapping
Comparative advantage
Armed groups
Colombia
Interviews
Law Courts Justice
CPS
1 PDF
Dataverse
Partners in Crime: Comparative Advantage and Kidnapping Cooperation was authored by Danielle Gilbert. It was published by Sage in CPS in 2025.

đź§© The Puzzle and Argument

Existing literature often assumes armed groups must be similar to cooperate or else will not cooperate at all. This article challenges that view by arguing that explicit differences—when one actor has a comparative advantage—can enable cooperation. The concept of "black market white labeling" is introduced to describe situations in which one organization buys an illicit good or service from another and rebrands it as its own. Applied to kidnapping, this framework explains why rebels and criminal gangs, groups that typically avoid collaboration, nevertheless work together to produce violence.

🎙️ Interviews With Colombian Kidnappers and Recovery Teams

  • Primary evidence comes from 113 interviews.
  • Interview subjects include Colombian kidnappers and hostage recovery personnel from Colombia and the United States.
  • Kidnapping is treated as an underexplored but common form of armed-group violence and the focal empirical case for the theory.

🔎 What the Analysis Shows

  • Comparative advantage provides a mechanism for cooperation between dissimilar armed actors, overturning the expectation that similarity is a prerequisite for collaboration.
  • "Black market white labeling" is identified as a distinct form of cooperation: one actor purchases illicit services or goods and presents them as its own operations.
  • The article develops a theory of the conditions under which rebels outsource kidnapping to criminal gangs versus when they conduct kidnappings in-house.
  • Organizational dynamics of rebel–criminal cooperation are shown to play a central role in perpetuating violence against civilians.

⚠️ Why This Matters

This work reframes how scholars and policymakers think about armed-group collaboration: cooperation can stem from complementary capacities rather than similarity, and market-style transactions between rebels and criminals can obscure responsibility while sustaining civilian-targeted violence. Understanding these transactional dynamics is therefore crucial for both research on armed groups and efforts to reduce violence against civilians.

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Comparative Political Studies
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