Autocratic elite divisions are often seen as a key stepping stone toward democratic reform. This study shows that those divisions only spur liberalization under certain historical conditions: specifically, the origins of the ruling party.

📊 How the argument was tested

Using panel matching analyses, the relationship between elite splits and subsequent political liberalization was evaluated across cases of autocratic rule. The analysis isolates the effect of elite divisions while accounting for observable confounders and tests whether party origins condition that effect.

🔍 Key findings

• Elite divisions generally increase the likelihood of political liberalization.
• That positive effect is significantly reduced when the ruling party grew out of national struggles such as revolutions, insurgencies, or independence movements.
• Dictators whose parties stem from these national struggles can blunt elite-driven reform by:
• offering “carrots” to the military (co-optation and rewards), and
• applying “sticks” to citizens and political opponents (repression and exclusion).
• These patterns hold after multiple robustness checks and additional analyses aimed at the underlying causal mechanisms.

⚖️ Why this matters

Party origins—whether a regime’s ruling organization emerged from national liberation or insurgent struggle—operate as a critical juncture that shapes a regime’s openness to liberalization. This finding suggests that party origins, not just regime origins, strongly condition the prospects for democratic reform in autocracies, with implications for how scholars and policymakers assess windows for democratization.