💡 Central Argument

Contemporary right-skewed wealth distributions produce similarly skewed pools of campaign resources, which means that increased pressures to spend on campaigns disproportionately benefit very wealthy candidates. The paper develops a theory explaining how those financing pressures translate into advantages for the very rich and identifies several conditions that determine how large those advantages become and at whose expense they accrue.

📊 New Cross-National Wealth Data and Natural Experiments

• A unique original dataset covering wealth information for more than 23,000 national legislators from 41 countries.
• Quasi-random variation in financing pressures exploited via recent campaign finance reforms in Brazil and Chile, serving as natural experiments to assess causal effects.

🔍 Key Findings

• Greater campaign financing pressures lead to higher shares of wealthy legislators in legislatures.
• The effect is strongest for the very wealthy, who gain the largest relative share when financing pressures increase.
• These advantages vary across contexts in ways consistent with the theoretical predictions about which conditions amplify or blunt the rich’s financing edge.

🧭 Why It Matters

The results link wealth inequality to political representation by showing a clear mechanism—campaign spending pressures—through which the super-rich gain parliamentary share. Findings inform debates on campaign finance reform and representation, highlighting how changes in financing rules can reshape the socioeconomic composition of elected bodies.