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How Congress Quietly Shares Responsibility for Presidential Wars
Insights from the Field
War Powers
Blame Avoidance
Congress
Sentiment Analysis
Presidency
American Politics
APSR
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15 Datasets
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Dataverse
War and Responsibility was authored by Patrick Hulme. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2025 est..

Many observers decry an "imperial presidency" in war-making, equating unilateral force with an unconstrained executive. This research reframes the war powers debate by centering the powerful incentives lawmakers have to avoid blame for military action.

🧭 A Theory of Shared Blame: "Loss Responsibility Costs"

A formal model of the war powers highlights "Loss Responsibility Costs." It argues that:

  • Presidents risk full-scale, authorized war primarily when formal congressional authorization provides political cover by distributing responsibility.
  • Smaller interventions are frequently launched unilaterally because congressional actors prefer a situation in which the president acts alone—this outcome aligns with lawmakers' incentives to avoid being held responsible.

📊 Sentiment Evidence From Tens of Thousands of Congressional Speeches

Novel sentiment data drawn from tens of thousands of congressional floor speeches tests the theory. The analysis finds that when presidents act without formal authorization, they almost always do so in a context of lawmaker support characterized by:

  • Positive sentiment toward intervention among many lawmakers
  • A deliberate avoidance of formal endorsement that would expose legislators to blame

✳️ Key Findings

  • Formal authorization matters: it supplies the political cover needed for presidents to undertake full-scale war by forcing shared responsibility.
  • Unilateral small-scale interventions are common because they satisfy lawmakers' blame-avoidance preferences.
  • Congressional rhetoric shows lawmakers privately or rhetorically supporting interventions while steering clear of votes or formal endorsements that would attach responsibility.
  • The combined theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that legislators exert greater influence over war decisions than is commonly assumed.

💡 Why It Matters

This work challenges the simple narrative of an unconstrained executive in war powers. By revealing how blame avoidance shapes both presidential choices and congressional behavior, it reframes assessments of legislative power, accountability, and the politics of military intervention.

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