Why Meritocracy Can Stabilize Authoritarian Rule

Authoritarian regimes may adopt meritocratic political selection not to expand redistribution but to co-opt large numbers of ordinary citizens by offering a credible path to socioeconomic advancement. This argument depends on the selection process being seen as inclusive and rule-based rather than arbitrary.

📊 How This Was Studied

Focus is placed on the civil service examination in contemporary China and its effect on college graduates' relationship to the regime. The study exploits spatial–cohort variation in applicant eligibility as a source of identification, comparing groups who were differently eligible across places and cohorts to isolate the exam's effect on perceptions and preferences.

🔍 Key Findings

• The civil service exam increases college graduates' perceived chances of upward mobility.
• Higher perceived upward mobility weakens graduates' demand for income redistribution, even as inequality increases.
• The effect operates through the belief that advancement is attainable via an inclusive, rule-based selection process rather than through redistribution.

⚖️ Why It Matters

These results point to an alternative mode of authoritarian co-optation: meritocratic selection can substitute for redistribution by sustaining support or dampening redistributive demands among potentially restive groups. The findings highlight upward mobility as a central mechanism in regime stability and suggest that apparent liberalizing institutions like meritocratic exams may serve strategic, stabilizing purposes in non-democratic contexts.