🔎 What This Project Asks

Opposition coalitions under electoral authoritarianism can boost opposition vote share and sometimes threaten regimes. This research asks whether coalitions also create risks: when a coalition performs strongly but fails to win power, does that paradoxically accelerate autocratization?

📊 How the Evidence Was Gathered and Compared

• A cross-national quantitative analysis examines the relationship between coalition formation, opposition performance, turnover outcomes, and subsequent regime trajectories.
• A focused case study on Cambodia traces the mechanisms by which coalition strength shapes regime responses.

📈 Main Findings

• Coalition formation is associated with stronger overall opposition performance across cases.
• However, when strong coalition performance does not produce turnover, exceptionally strong showings predict greater autocratization in subsequent years.
• Autocratization outcomes include increased repression and declines in electoral quality in later contests.
• The likely mechanism is that high-performing but unsuccessful coalitions give incumbents both the incentive and the capacity to repress and reconsolidate power.

🌏 What the Cambodia Case Shows

• Cambodia illustrates how the same coalition features that raise electoral performance—visible organization, concentrated support, and clear opposition leadership—also create focal points for regime countermeasures.
• In that context, regimes responded with a mix of repression and institutional tactics that reduced future electoral competitiveness.

⚖️ Why This Matters

• Coalition building under electoral authoritarianism is a double-edged sword: it can strengthen opposition performance but also make failed near-victories a trigger for backsliding.
• The findings have implications for scholars of democratization and for opposition strategists considering the trade-offs between maximizing electoral performance and avoiding punitive regime backlash.