Key Argument: This research explores the relationship between military ties and civilian political survival in China. We propose that autocrats strategically differentiate rivals based on their social connections to the military, manipulating career progression as a means of security.

Data & Methods:

We leverage an original dataset comprising over 117,000 postings for 34,140 Chinese military officers spanning 1927-2014. This extensive mapping reveals complex networks connecting the civilian and military elite during this period.

Key Findings: Our analysis demonstrates that civilians with strong social ties to the military experience differential promotion outcomes.

Those linked strongly to the military receive more frequent promotions to lower-tier institutions*. This increased access might represent a form of reward or integration into supporting roles.

Conversely, these same civilians face significantly reduced prospects for promotion to higher-tier positions*, specifically targeting leadership roles within the Central Committee. Their ties appear detrimental at the apex level.

Why It Matters:

This nuanced career trajectory explains how civilian rivals with military connections might still be integrated into the political system but remain strategically excluded from direct succession challenges to the top leader. The pattern suggests autocrats utilize network differentiation as a subtle yet effective tool for maintaining control.