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Competition Helps Top Scholars but Harms Others in Italian Academia
Insights from the Field
contest theory
all-pay auction
promotion
Italy
publications
Teaching and Learning
RESTAT
7 Stata files
2 Text
3 Other
Dataverse
Incentives and Careers in Academia: Theory and Empirical Analysis was authored by Stefano Verzillo, Daniele Checchi and Gianni De Fraja. It was published by MIT Press in RESTAT in 2021.

๐Ÿ” Research Question and Theory

This study examines career concerns in Italian academia by modeling academic promotion as a contest. The theoretical framework uses the standard contest model formalized as a multiunit all-pay auction. In this framework, the following parameters determine academics' effort and output:

  • the number of posts available
  • the number of applicants competing
  • the relative importance of different criteria for promotion

๐Ÿ“Š Data: A New Publication Census and Institutional Features

Italian incentives operate primarily through promotion decisions, and appointment panels are drawn from strictly separated, relatively narrow scientific sectors. Those institutional features allow the payoff-relevant parameters to be measured with precision. The empirical analysis uses a newly constructed dataset that collects the journal publications of all Italian university professors.

๐Ÿงช Identification: Exploiting a 1999 Reform

Identification leverages variation from a reform introduced in 1999, parts of which affected different academics differently. That staggered impact provides exogenous variation in promotion rules, sector competitiveness, and the weight placed on publications for advancement.

โš–๏ธ Key Findings

  • Individual researchers respond to incentives in a way consistent with the contest model.
  • More capable researchers generally increase effort when publications gain importance for promotion or when the scientific sector becomes more competitive.
  • Less able researchers tend to be discouraged by increased competition and often reduce effort.
  • Heterogeneity in ability thus produces divergent behavioral responses to the same institutional changes.

๐Ÿ“Œ Why It Matters

Linking contest theory to comprehensive publication data shows how promotion design and sector-level competitiveness shape academic output. The results imply that reforms changing the importance of publications or the intensity of competition can systematically reallocate effort across ability types, with potential consequences for hiring, promotion policy, and the distribution of academic productivity.

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