The Influence of Legislative Reappointment on State Supreme Court Decision-Making

This study examines legislative influence over state supreme court decision-making in the United States, focusing specifically on South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. It demonstrates that justices appointed by the minority party who are still eligible for reappointment tend to vote more closely with their legislature's preferences than those ineligible due to mandatory or voluntary retirement requirements.

Eligibility Matters:

* Court tenure is time-bound in these states, necessitating legislative retention or election for continuation.

* Minority-party appointees actively seeking new terms align their votes with legislative preferences more than non-seeking justices do.

Party Differences & Retention Risk:

* The study finds no similar effect among majority-party appointed judges who are not reappointment-eligible.

* This partisan difference is crucial for understanding the dynamics of judicial selection systems in these states.

Legislative Power vs. Governor's Role:

* Legislative retention power significantly impacts justice voting when seeking re-election.

* Placebo tests reveal that governors lack comparable influence over such 'reappointment-seeking' justices.

This research highlights a substantial limitation on judicial independence in states where the legislature holds sole authority to retain supreme court justices.