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Insights from the Field

How National Thresholds Drive Electoral Disproportionality Across European Systems


thresholds
disproportionality
seat allocation
MAP-EM
Europe
Voting and Elections
Pol. An.
126 other files
18 text files
Dataverse
National Electoral Thresholds and Disproportionality was authored by Tasos Kalandrakis and Miguel Rueda. It was published by Cambridge in Pol. An. in 2021.

๐Ÿ”ง A stochastic threshold model and MAP-EM estimator

This article introduces a model for the conditional distribution of legislative seats given parties' vote shares that explicitly incorporates a stochastic national threshold of representation and a disproportionality parameter governing how seats are allocated among parties that clear the threshold. Conditions are derived that guarantee the model parameters are identifiable from observed seats/votes data, and a Maximum a Posteriori Expectation-Maximization (MAP-EM) algorithm is developed to estimate those parameters.

๐Ÿ“Š Data: 116 electoral systems, 417 lower-house elections across 36 European countries

  • Covers 417 elections to lower houses in 36 European countries since WWII.
  • Includes 116 distinct national electoral system configurations observed across those elections.

๐Ÿงช Model fit and specification tests

  • The estimated model is rejected in only 5 of the 116 systems, indicating broad empirical fit.
  • A simpler model that omits a national threshold is rejected in favor of the threshold model in 49 systems, showing that thresholds matter empirically in many cases.

๐Ÿ” Key patterns in electoral systems

  • Two modal configurations emerge:
  • Higher effective thresholds combined with seat allocation for parties above the threshold that is not statistically different from perfectly proportional allocation (32.76% of systems).
  • Systems where a national threshold cannot be statistically distinguished from absence of a threshold, but where seat allocation among eligible parties shows significant disproportionality (38.79% of systems).

๐Ÿงพ Procedures for detecting institutional change

  • The article also develops statistical procedures to test for significant changes over time in electoral institutions and/or in the distribution of seats, allowing formal detection of institutional shifts and their effects on proportionality.

โ— Why it matters

  • Provides a unified, identifiable framework for separating the effects of national thresholds from the degree of proportionality in seat allocation.
  • Offers a practical estimator (MAP-EM) and diagnostic tests that enable comparative research on electoral design, interpretation of proportionality measures, and the detection of institutional change using readily available seats/votes data.
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