This article analyzes a unique policy change in Nebraska in 1937, its switch from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. Using the synthetic control method (SCM), which creates an artificial counterfactual state by combining other states as controls, I estimate the impact of this change on government expenditures.

Methodology & Context

The study employs SCM rather than traditional comparison methods to isolate the effect of legislative structure. By comparing post-switch spending in Nebraska against its synthetic control group derived from weighted averages of similar states, it circumvents potential biases.

Key Findings

The analysis reveals two main effects:

* A sharp decrease in expenditures per capita immediately following the switch (relative to the synthetic control).

* This initial drop faded over subsequent years as the difference between real and synthetic Nebraska diminished. Placebo tests, randomly assigning the legislative change among states, show that such an effect would occur with only a 2.13% probability by chance.

Implications for Political Science Research

The findings provide nuanced insights regarding legislative structures. While the initial drop suggests support for theories linking more veto players (bicameralism) to higher spending, the fading of this difference over time implies that legislators may effectively circumvent such structural constraints.