Introduction: Rising ideological polarization and legislative dysfunction spark concerns about whether Congress can still effectively constrain the U.S. Executive Branch within the separation of powers system.

Data & Methods: This article analyzes a new dataset (1923–2019) containing House and Senate appropriations committee reports to empirically explore how Congress navigates gridlock-induced incapacity.

Key Findings:

* Non-statutory policymaking tools, traditionally used in appropriation contexts, are increasingly employed by committees.

* These mechanisms are strategically deployed when overcoming legislative gridlock is most difficult.

* They become particularly prominent for addressing interbranch agency problems during politically challenging periods.

* This pattern suggests non-statutory measures may serve as a crucial means for Congress to retain its power over the executive branch, despite internal constraints.

Why It Matters: The findings imply that even amidst legislative gridlock stemming from polarization, Congress can maintain significant influence over agencies through alternative mechanisms embedded in budgetary processes. These tools represent an important adaptation by one branch of government attempting to constrain another's policymaking activities within a democratic system experiencing dysfunction.