🧾 The Puzzle
Ministers may use secondary legislation to depart from compromises embedded in primary laws. When that happens, coalition partners can lack internal cabinet tools to stop such deviations. In some countries, courts that review proposed secondary rules ex ante can serve as an extra-cabinet control mechanism that disciplines ministerial behavior.
🔎 How This Was Studied
Focus is placed on the interaction between Italian governments and the Council of State—the highest administrative court and a key government consultative body. The analysis examines the Council's advisory and adjudicatory activity in contexts where secondary legislation is at stake to assess whether demand for external control drives judicial involvement.
đź“Ś Key Findings
- The Council of State’s advisory activism increases where there is demand for additional control over secondary legislation.
- That demand is shaped by political conditions, especially:
- government heterogeneity (more diverse coalitions), and
- government alternation (changes in which parties govern).
- In Italy, coalition partners appear able to rely on ex-ante legal scrutiny by the Council as a mechanism outside the cabinet that checks ministers’ policy drift via secondary rules.
🌍 Why It Matters
These results show that administrative courts can play an important, politically driven role in executive oversight. The Italian case offers a starting point for comparative research on how and why administrative courts vary in their involvement in executive politics across European democracies.
