This paper explores the tension between coercive threats by powerful states and their ability to make credible security assurances in international relations.

Problem: States often face a credibility dilemma when making promises about security under threatening conditions. Coercion, while potentially strengthening an assurance through demonstration of resolve, can also undermine trust if perceived as unreliable or inconsistent.

Method: The analysis examines historical cases and theoretical frameworks to unpack the complex relationship between these two seemingly contradictory phenomena.

### Key Findings

* Credible assurances require consistency in behavior over time despite pressure to coerce adversaries.

* Coercive actions, particularly escalatory ones, significantly damage perceived assurance credibility.

* The effectiveness of a state's internal institutions and commitment mechanisms plays a crucial role in maintaining assurance trust even amidst external pressures.

### Significance

Understanding this dynamic is vital for analyzing arms control talks, territorial disputes, and security commitments between major powers. It highlights that seemingly strong states may face significant constraints on their ability to reassure allies effectively.