This article investigates whether participation in a Brazil-led bloc within global financial institutions affects the volume of Brazilian foreign aid received, situating the question in the context of South–South Cooperation (SSC).

🔎 Research Focus:

The study examines the link between Brazilian aid flows and coalition formation in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Attention centers on whether countries that join the Brazilian coalition for the selection of Executive Board representatives receive larger aid allocations from Brazil than countries outside the coalition.

📊 How alliances and aid were compared:

• Key variables: Brazilian foreign aid (SSC), membership in the Brazil-led coalition, and alliances formed for selecting Executive Board representatives in the IMF and the World Bank.
• Institutional focus: both organizations’ Executive Boards are the decision arenas analyzed, since board composition and representative selection drive alliance behavior.
• Design emphasis: the analysis compares aid volumes for countries that participate in the Brazilian coalition against those that do not, with a focus on coalition behavior tied to Executive Board formation.

🔑 Key Findings:

• Countries that join the Brazilian coalition for the formation of the IMF and World Bank Executive Boards receive more Brazilian foreign aid than countries that do not join.
• The results confirm the hypothesis that coalition participation tied to Executive Board selection is associated with higher aid receipts from Brazil.

⚖️ Why it matters:

These findings link diplomatic coalition-building in international financial organizations to concrete resource flows, highlighting how South–South Cooperation can function as a tool of influence in global governance. The results are relevant for scholarship on aid diplomacy, representation on multilateral boards, and the political strategies of emerging donors.