🔎 Core Argument

When future leader turnover in an adversary becomes more likely, leaders today may prefer to preserve peace even when peace is costly. Costly peaceful measures—such as arming to deter—shrink the set of settlements that are preferable to war and thus raise the risk of conflict. Prospective turnover, however, introduces uncertainty about the future need for and burden of deterrent measures, making enduring an unfavorable peace today rational if a more favorable peace could arise under a new leader tomorrow.

⚙️ How the mechanism works

• Costly peace reduces the bargaining range and raises the temptation to attack.
• Prospective leader turnover creates uncertainty about future deterrence costs and necessity.
• When an adversary shows low prospects for turnover, states locked into a costly peace are more likely to attack.
• When turnover prospects are high, those same states tolerate an unfavorable peace now in anticipation of potentially lower costs or better terms after leadership change.
• The relationship holds even when expected costs do not decline — and can persist even if costs might rise — because shifts in peace costs affect the parties asymmetrically.

📊 Evidence from rival-level tests

• Quantitative analyses examine the prospects for future leader turnover, patterns of military spending (as an observable costly peace measure), and war initiation among rivals.
• Empirical results align with the theoretical predictions: higher expected leadership volatility in an adversary correlates with greater peaceful forbearance today despite costly deterrence.

💡 Why this matters

• Challenges the conventional association of leader turnover with greater immediate conflict risk by showing conditions where turnover promotes peace.
• Highlights the role of expectations about future leadership and the costs of deterrence in shaping bargaining outcomes and war onset.
• Suggests that anticipating leadership volatility can make peaceful restraint a prudent strategic choice.