đź“ť What Was Studied
This study evaluates whether British incumbents are electorally punished when constituents disagree with their stance on Brexit. Accountability requires voters to withhold support from representatives whose positions are “out of step”; this research tests how strongly that mechanism operates for Brexit, an issue that should be especially visible and salient.
🔍 How Voter Choices Were Measured
The analysis links individual-level voter disagreement with their MP’s Brexit stance to vote choice, and then examines constituency-level consequences for incumbent vote share. A follow-up survey of Members of Parliament captured MPs’ own estimates of how much voter–MP issue congruence influences electoral support.
đź“Š Key Findings
- Individuals who disagreed with their representative’s Brexit stance were 3 percentage points less likely to vote for that incumbent.
- At the constituency level, a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of constituents who agreed with their incumbent’s Brexit stance was associated with a 0.53 percentage point increase in incumbent vote share.
- Those constituency-level effects were about 1.5 times larger when the main challenger held a different Brexit stance from the incumbent.
- MPs’ own estimates of the electoral effect of issue congruence were similar in magnitude to the observed effects.
âť— Why It Matters
Issue accountability appears to be conditional and modest in size, even for Brexit—an issue expected to generate strong sanctioning behavior. The results imply that disagreement over high-salience issues produces only limited electoral punishment, and that incumbents’ perceptions of these limits align closely with observed voter behavior.
