Incumbents in electoral regimes often keep power despite regular multiparty contests. One way they do so is by preventing a strong, unified opposition from emerging.

🔎 What Was Investigated

A specific cooptation channel is examined: appointing opposition politicians to ministerial cabinet posts. The mechanism considered is straightforward—when some opposition figures can secure cabinet positions from the incumbent, they have incentives to run independently rather than join broad parties or electoral alliances, which hinders opposition consolidation and helps the incumbent remain competitive.

🧭 Theory: A Strategic Cooptation Model

• A formal model shows incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by offering cabinet posts to opposition politicians.
• The model predicts that opposition actors who have access to cabinet office are less likely to coalesce and more likely to compete as independent or small-party candidates.
• The model also predicts that weaker incumbents—those who face greater electoral risk—are more likely to rely on this cooptation strategy to blunt potential challengers.

📊 Data: Presidential Elections Across Africa (1990–2016)

• Original dataset covering presidential elections in African countries from 1990 through 2016.
• Measurement captures instances of past cooptation (appointments of opposition politicians to ministerial positions) and the composition of opposition fields in subsequent elections.

🔬 Empirical Strategy and Key Findings

• Past cooptation of opposition politicians is empirically associated with a more fragmented opposition field in subsequent presidential elections.
• The empirical evidence is consistent with the model’s mechanism: cabinet offers reduce incentives for opposition coordination, and cooptation is used more frequently by incumbents facing greater vulnerability.

⚖️ Why It Matters

This study identifies a subtle but powerful anti-consolidation tactic that incumbents can use within nominally competitive elections. By turning potential opposition leaders into cabinet colleagues, incumbents can fragment challengers, undermine party-building and alliance formation, and thereby preserve their hold on power even under multiparty rules.