🧭 How the argument connects welfare provision and borrowing
This article develops a comparative political economy theory linking how welfare states distribute benefits and how credit regimes regulate access to credit with everyday household borrowing. The core claim is that interactions between social policy design and credit availability shape how people manage social risks and thus create distinct patterns of indebtedness across countries.
📊 Evidence comes from a new measure and three data sources
- An original index measuring credit-regime permissiveness.
- Cross-national survey data comparing household borrowing patterns.
- Full-population administrative records from Denmark and panel survey data from the United States.
🔑 Key findings
- In limited welfare states with permissive credit regimes, access to credit substitutes for social protections and pushes economically disadvantaged groups into debt.
- In comprehensive welfare states, credit markets tend to complement social policies: government benefits protect vulnerable groups, while less-protected, more affluent households use borrowing for liquidity.
- In restrictive regimes, households rely primarily on savings, spending cuts, and family support rather than formal credit.
⚖️ Why this matters
These results show that credit-market rules matter for distributional outcomes: permissive credit can increase indebtedness among the vulnerable when social protection is thin, while generous welfare provision changes which social groups turn to borrowing. The findings have implications for debates about financial regulation, social policy design, and the political economy of household vulnerability.
