FIND DATA: By Author | Journal | Sites   ANALYZE DATA: Help with R | SPSS | Stata | Excel   WHAT'S NEW? US Politics | Int'l Relations | Law & Courts
   FIND DATA: By Author | Journal | Sites   WHAT'S NEW? US Politics | IR | Law & Courts
If this link is broken, please report as broken. You can also submit updates (will be reviewed).
IMF Lending Paradox: Systemic Risks vs. Political Priorities in Latin America and Eastern Europe
Insights from the Field
IMF Lending
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Systemic Risk
International Relations
ISQ
3 Stata files
3 Datasets
Dataverse
Public Goods or Political Pandering: Evidence from IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe was authored by Grigore Pop-Eleches. It was published by Oxford in ISQ in 2009.

New empirical evidence challenges conventional views of IMF lending practices.

This study examines preferential treatment during two distinct periods—1982-1994 and 1995-2001—in Latin American and East European countries.

Data & Methods: Analyzes historical case documents from the International Monetary Fund period, employing qualitative content analysis to identify lending patterns.

### Key Findings

• During systemic crises (1982-1994), IMF prioritized systemically important nations over technocratic fairness principles,

• In non-crisis situations (1995-2001), narrow political considerations gained prominence despite continued regional focus,

• The Bagehot Doctrine's impartiality principle was inconsistently applied across both periods.

### Implications & Context

These findings highlight the tension between international financial stability and domestic political interests in crisis management. They suggest lending preferences reflected a dynamic interplay of economic imperatives, geopolitical shifts, and institutional constraints rather than static motivations.

data
Find on Google Scholar
Find on JSTOR
Find on OUP
International Studies Quarterly
Podcast host Ryan