Decree Power in Parliamentary Systems

This article investigates the use of decree power by elected governments in parliamentary systems, focusing on India as a case study. Contrary to theoretical expectations that legislative authority would prevent such moves, empirical evidence reveals frequent instances where Indian prime ministers bypass traditional legislative processes.

## The Core Puzzle

Why do Indian prime ministers issue ordinances so regularly despite their constitutional constraints? The article argues these discretionary instruments are strategically deployed during election years.

## New Findings

Our analysis demonstrates that ordinances increase significantly before elections, particularly for parties with weak legislative majorities. This pattern suggests governments use decree-making as a strategic vote-buying tool to maintain authority and manage policy initiatives.

## The Data & Methods

We analyzed all post-independence Indian ordinances from 1947-2016 using digital corpus analysis combined with elite interviews across parties, civil society groups, and bureaucratic agencies. This mixed-method approach provides unprecedented insights into the phenomenon over time.

## Why It Matters Now

Decree power fundamentally reconfigures accountability in India's parliamentary democracy. The findings offer a novel explanation for democratic backsliding through seemingly legalistic means—electoral timing shapes legislative-executive relations, even when formal rules appear to constrain them.