How does party discipline form under institutional constraints? We argue that even when personal vote cultivation is banned, as in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, it depends on parties' electoral incentives. Candidate selection rules only affect legislative behavior conditionally.

Data & Methods

We analyze data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies to test our theory connecting party leaders' strategic decisions with unity outcomes.

* Source: Institutional arrangement banning reelection in Mexico creates a unique testing ground for candidate selection effects.

* Analysis: We examine legislative behavior under these specific conditions, focusing on how parties adapt their selection rules strategically.

Key Findings

Party leaders use candidate selection as strategic tools rather than simply reflecting internal preferences. The impact of selection mechanisms varies based on electoral goals and incentives within the party structure.

* Mechanism: Selection processes are influenced by broader electoral strategies, not just institutional factors like reelection bans.

* Outcome: Legislative behavior reflects conditional strategy implementation by parties aiming to maximize overall electoral success.

Why It Matters

This study refines political science understanding of party organization and discipline. The findings highlight the interplay between candidate selection processes and broader electoral objectives.