A counterintuitive finding suggests that executives pursue unilateral power less under divided government. This article argues that polarization and marginal majorities hinder legislative retaliation against executive actions in a separation of powers system. Using 24,232 US state executive orders from 1993–2013 – the largest analysis to date – we demonstrate how lawmakers can block unilateralism through statutory responses or other nonstatutory tools.

### A Surprising Pattern

Executives are less likely to act unilaterally when facing divided government. This contradicts assumptions that polarization leads to more executive power.

### The Underlying Mechanism

Legislative capacity becomes crucial during opposition:

• Polarization and marginal majorities weaken legislative ability to retaliate effectively
• Lack of nonstatutory tools (like regulatory review) makes statutory responses even harder

### What the Data Shows

Our large-scale analysis reveals a clear pattern: higher polarization with divided government actually constrains, not encourages, executive unilateralism.

These findings highlight how legislative power shapes separation-of-powers dynamics.