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Defection Risks Emerge as Autocrats Adopt Anti-opposition Strategies: Russia Dataset Reveals Hidden Vulnerabilities
Insights from the Field
elite defection
russia
candidates
integrity
political spoils
strategy
Comparative Politics
APSR
6 R files
3 datasets
1 other files
Dataverse
Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia was authored by David Szakonyi and Ora John Reuter. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2019.

Elite cohesion is essential to authoritarian stability, yet high-level defections can threaten regimes. Analyzing 4,291 Russian ruling party candidates provides insights into elite integrity under autocracy.

Data & Methods:

This study utilizes a comprehensive dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia. It employs quantitative analysis and hypothesis testing to examine elite behavior patterns.

Key Findings:

Defections increase when regimes face greater uncertainty about providing spoils. Ironically, anti-opposition tactics may create more vulnerabilities than they prevent. Defectors often include regime insiders with strong personal followings or business connections who can pursue independent political goals.

Why It Matters:

These findings highlight crucial tradeoffs in authoritarian survival strategies. The study demonstrates that seemingly contradictory approaches to managing elites and opposition can heighten defection risks, offering fresh insights into autocratic stability.

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