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Shell Corporations: Why Do Tax Havens Comply More Than OECD Countries?
Insights from the Field
field experiment
anonymous incorporation
tax havens
OECD countries
corruption risk
terrorism risk
International Relations
AJPS
3 Stata files
Dataverse
Causes of Non-Compliance With International Law: A Field Experiment on Anonymous Incorporation was authored by Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson and J.C. Sharman. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2015.

This study investigates non-compliance with international law regarding anonymous incorporation services.

Experimental Approach in 172 Countries

The research employs two field experiments, contacting firms worldwide posing as consultants seeking confidential incorporation. Experimental conditions varied monetary reward offers and legal/regulatory information presented to assess effects on compliance behavior.

Compliance Patterns Across Regions

Offers for anonymous corporate formation vary significantly across jurisdictions:

  • Countries classified as tax havens demonstrate notably higher compliance rates than OECD nations
  • In contrast, incorporation services in poorer regions often show greater compliance than their wealthier counterparts
  • Notably, raising international law standards alone does not meaningfully increase compliance
  • Customer risk information and monetary incentives influence the offers made but do not necessarily align with improved compliance outcomes
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