This research explores how elections in authoritarian systems can influence democratic transitions.

Core Argument: The likelihood of democratization following competitive authoritarian elections depends on two factors: (1) the relative weakness of the incumbent regime, and (2) active pressure from domestic or international actors.

Theoretical Focus & Data:

* Examines the distinction between competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

* Analyzes a comprehensive dataset covering authoritarian elections from 1990 to 2007 across various countries.

Key Findings:

* Relatively weaker incumbents are more susceptible to democratization pressures during competitive elections.

* This vulnerability explains why such elections pose a greater threat to established autocratic rule compared to those in stronger regimes.

* International conditionality and opposition coalitions significantly influence outcomes, but only within the specific context of weak incumbency.

Policy Implications:

These findings suggest that democratization efforts should strategically target competitive authoritarian systems with weaker leaders.