This article explores why some countries pursue irredentism—annexing territories based on ethnic ties—while others do not. It examines three key factors: the triadic structure involving a kin group, its coethnic enclave, and the host state; economic parity between groups leading to status inconsistency and grievances; and ethnically homogeneous countries with winner-take-all systems where minority groups feel no need to moderate their electoral strategies.

Data & Methods

Drawing on new data covering all historical irredentist cases from 1946–2014, the analysis employs empirical research techniques to identify causal relationships. Findings reveal that triadic structures combined with specific socioeconomic and political conditions create environments where ethnic annexation becomes politically viable.

Key Findings

Irredentism emerges most frequently when:

• Status inconsistency exists due to economic parity between groups
• Ethnic enclaves provide a base for minority mobilization
• Winner-take-all electoral systems stifle compromise between majority and minority interests