Introduction

This research examines the relationship between presidential unilateral actions and true executive power. Rather than simply analyzing these tools as indicators of presidential dominance, we explore how legislative preferences shape such decisions.

Our approach has three key components: (1) developing 3 competing theoretical models about presidential discretion; (2) creating a new method to assess executive order significance using an extended item-response framework; and (3) testing these theories against historical data from 1947-2002.

Theoretical Framework

We demonstrate that legislative preferences influence unilateral actions in unexpected ways. Our analysis reveals parties' significant impact on presidential decisions through executive orders - a finding previously underappreciated in political science literature.

Empirical Findings

Contrary to conventional wisdom, our data shows that presidents often act strategically based on the stance of legislative majorities rather than exercising absolute control. A model highlighting presidential responsiveness fits better with historical evidence (1947-2002) than previously dominant assumptions.

Key Implications

The research suggests legislative parties and judicial enforcers are crucial factors shaping executive action outcomes. This challenges the view that unilateral orders automatically equate to strong presidential power.