This article examines whether U.S. legislative apportionment rules from the Constitutional Convention were unavoidable.

🔍 Data & Methods

We simulated voting preferences based on historical vote shares across states to analyze their relative stability under various constitutional rules.

⚖️ Key Findings

The outcome depended critically on state participation:

* With 13 states (excluding RI/NH), equal apportionment was stable.

* As these two states dropped out later, all rules became top cycle again.

* The emergence of the Three-Fifths Compromise in a stable equilibrium occurred only after New York departed from earlier stages.

📜 Historical Context

The analysis demonstrates how different state compositions influenced which apportionment rule gained traction during debates.

🌐 Why This Matters

The findings suggest that political outcomes are shaped significantly by historical circumstances and participant withdrawals, challenging the notion of inherent necessity.