Does patronage boost or hinder governance? This article argues that patron-client networks can enhance bureaucratic performance. Specifically, it examines how city leaders' past political ties to provincial officials influence economic development. Using a novel dataset and method identifying these ties from promotion records between 2000-2011, we find strong evidence: mayors connected to their bosses deliver significantly faster growth.

Data & Methods:

Original panel data at the city level during 2000–2011

A new method identifying patronage ties from promotion histories

Key Findings:

• City leaders with informal ties to provincial officials show higher economic performance

• These connections appear to enhance implementation capacity rather than simply rewarding cronies

• The findings challenge simplistic views of clientelism as purely obstructive

Alternative Explanations Addressed:

✓ Vertical accountability concerns ruled out through robust controls

✓ Horizontal competition effects accounted for in the analysis

✓ Alternative explanations systematically tested and rejected

This suggests patronage networks serve important enabling functions. These insights highlight how informal political institutions shape bureaucratic effectiveness within authoritarian systems.