Central governments often face compliance challenges when relying on local authorities, especially in authoritarian systems where citizens aren't directly involved in elections. This study presents a national-scale field experiment conducted in China to examine how public, non-governmental ratings of municipal governments' adherence to central directives—specifically regarding pollution information disclosure—affect compliance levels.

Research Design & Context:

• A randomized experiment involving Chinese municipalities

• Central mandates focused on increasing transparency about pollution management

• Non-governmental monitoring aimed at reducing implementation gaps between Beijing and local authorities

Key Findings:

• Treatment effects show a significant increase in compliance rates after just one year

• Positive reinforcement effect persists even into the second post-treatment year

• Public ratings effectively lower monitoring costs for central governments without necessarily increasing public awareness or media focus on environmental issues

Implications & Takeaways:

This research demonstrates that nonstate actors can significantly enhance governance mechanisms in authoritarian contexts. The findings suggest strategic opportunities for improving compliance systems through carefully designed NGO-government partnerships, offering practical insights for policymakers seeking to strengthen implementation processes.