Why do mediocre individuals staff authoritarian secret police? This article explains the career incentives that drive underperforming officials into these roles. In autocratic Argentina (1975-83), low achievers in state bureaucracy faced limited advancement opportunities within regular security forces and frequent dismissal risks. Seeking alternative paths to career stability, they disproportionately joined the secret police force despite its demanding nature.

Argentina's Security Forces Data & Methods

Drawing from comprehensive records of all 4,287 officers serving during this period, we analyze biographic differences between secret police recruits and broader recruitment candidates. Our analysis reveals that officials stuck in lower ranks within Argentina's regime hierarchy were significantly more likely to pursue service in the intelligence agencies.

Key Mechanism: Career Incentives for Underachievers

Our findings demonstrate how weak institutional hierarchies create burdensome career incentives for those who cannot advance through standard channels. These individuals, facing professional stagnation or threat of dismissal elsewhere, sought refuge—and willingness—in secret police work where they could secure tenure.

Implications for Political Science Understanding

This research illuminates the mundane pathways to authoritarianism by showing how state bureaucracies can produce willing enforcers through career management rather than ideological commitment. Such findings help explain both autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown mechanisms.