This study examines how legislative turnover affects the effectiveness of revolving-door lobbyists. Using survey data and statistical analysis from a sample dataset representing interest groups across multiple continents, we find that increases in turnover or assembly size significantly reduce the value these individuals bring to their new roles.

Key Findings:

* Revolving door effectiveness declines with more legislative changes or larger assemblies.

* The study shows lower success rates for lobbying campaigns involving recently retired members compared to those using established former lobbyists.

* Interest groups respond by adjusting hiring practices based on these turnover dynamics.

Method and Context:

* Analysis draws from survey responses rather than continuous longitudinal data tracking lobbyist performance over time.

* Data points include detailed profiles of revolving door hires across various countries, but country-specific breakdowns are not provided in the dataset due to its aggregated nature.

* The findings suggest that legislative turnover has a direct bearing on lobbying dynamics and outcomes.