This paper challenges traditional views on presidential appointment power by examining vacancies in executive departments.

• Presidents frequently leave agency positions empty or fill them with unconfirmed interim appointees during 1977–2016. • New dataset analyzes these practices across multiple administrations and departments over decades.

A New Look at Presidential Appointments:

Presidential Confirmation, Not Just Appointment Power

Nomination Strategies as Political Tools:

Presidents strategically choose to leave positions vacant or appoint interim officers based on their priorities and the position's capacity. • These decisions reflect how presidents exercise control beyond formal confirmation processes.

Two Key Findings:

• Interim appointments are more common when positions have significant leeway for presidential policy goals.

• This approach allows presidents to leverage first-mover advantage, effectively managing agency responses before Senate review.

Presidential Sidestepping Discovered:

The findings suggest this is a deliberate tactic—presidents can strategically use vacancies or interim roles to influence agencies without formal confirmation. • It reveals nuanced ways executives shape policy agendas through non-traditional methods.

Implications for Separation-of-Powers Models:

Existing frameworks may underestimate how presidents exercise control outside formal channels by exploiting appointment gaps and timing. • This requires rethinking traditional models of legislative-executive relations.