Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies simultaneously rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations that argues these events fundamentally differ from piecemeal reforms in their political dynamics.

The Core Argument

Mass reorganization emerges as a structured decision-making process focused on government accountability. By treating it as such, the paper demonstrates how choices about agency independence, organizational structure, and functional disposition have distinct impacts on administrative policy making's political costs.

Analytical Approach

New data from the UK government reshuffle is analyzed using sequential logistic regression models to provide substantial support for these claims. This method allows tracking changes over time while accounting for various factors influencing decision outcomes.

Key Findings & Implications

* Reorganization type (mass vs piecemeal) significantly shapes political dynamics

* Agency independence and functional disposition decisions carry specific political costs

* The sequential nature reveals evolving political calculations

Challenging Existing Frameworks

The study challenges the current literature's focus on organizational survival in mass reorganizations. By centering democratic accountability, it uncovers essential politics obscured by previous approaches that neglected fundamental questions about party conflict and policy positions.