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Small Groups Can Drive Effective Climate Action Through Clubs and Incentives
Insights from the Field
climate club
game theory
United States
European Union
International Relations
BJPS
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Dataverse
The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation? was authored by Håkon Sælen, Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz and Arild Underdal. It was published by Cambridge in BJPS in 2019.

This article explores a surprising finding: even a climate club initiated by just a few countries can effectively reduce global emissions over time.

What's New?

The Paris Agreement made progress, but this paper shows that smaller clubs could be the key to broader cooperation. Using agent-based simulations, we demonstrate how limited initial membership doesn't doom these initiatives if they have the right conditions.

How Does It Work?

A climate club succeeds when:

• Initial members are a motivated constellation of actors (e.g., US + EU)

• Incentives for reluctant countries are sufficiently large

• Constraints from non-climate conflicts among members are manageable

The Evidence

The model highlights how conditional commitments and "club-good" benefits can attract broad participation. Countries gain entry by meeting climate goals, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.

These findings suggest that targeted club approaches may be more effective than waiting for universal agreements in the complex landscape of international climate negotiations.

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British Journal of Political Science
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